Tag Archives: Christian Apologetics

Commentary

Why is it rational to act in a self-sacrificial way on Christian theism?

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I guess everybody who reads the blog is familiar with my view that self-sacrificial moral behavior is not rationally grounded on atheism. Well, I got a great (snarky) question from a commenter (Gregory Lewis) who wanted me to explain WHY self-sacrifical morality is rational if Christian theism is true. So I wrote the stuff below to try to answer it. I’m not completely happy with it, but I tried.

Note, this is not exactly theologically correct. I do understand that salvation is by grace, and that doing good deeds is part of sanctification, not justificiation. I.e. – the good deeds do not save you, but they do affect your relationship with God, and everyone else, in the after-life.

My response

The question to be answered is why should a person act in a self-sacrificial way when it does not give them pleasure and may even result in punishment. On atheism, self-sacrifice is irrational because morality is illusory, we have no free will, and life is temporary. Your life purpose on atheism is to be as happy as possible before you die, and there is no room for self-sacrificial love just to be good. So it is not rational to sacrifice yourself for the “moral law”. There is no moral law, on atheism. That’s what I mean when I say that morality is not rational on atheism. I mean self-sacrificial morality is not rational, and it seems to me that this morality is the only kind that counts.

But here’s what is true on Christian theism:

1) the moral law is real (objective) not subjective and not arbitrary
2) humans have free will – we are not biologically determined
3) there is a real Creator/Designer who says we ought to obey the moral law
4) there is a final judgment where our free choices to obey or not are measured
5) obedience to the moral law affects the quality (not duration) of that eternal life
6) the author of the moral law loves us self-sacrificially

And what does all of this mean, on Christian Theism:

There is an objective moral standard that specifies what we (morally) ought to do on Christian theism, like self-sacrificial love. Our capacity to make a choice to accomodate that moral obligation is real, because we have consciousness and free will on Christian theism. There is a real way we ought to be, and a real capacity to choose to be that way. But sometimes being good that way sets us back, personally. Is self-sacrificial love rational when it reduces our pleasure in this life? What happens when doing the right thing results in LESS happiness in this life and maybe even LESS time to live in this life? Is self-sacrifice rational on Christianity?

Well, there are two things better than a finite amount of happiness in this life and a finite duration of this life. And that’s an infinite amount of happiness and an infinite duration of life. If we could get that by taking a little short-term pain here and now, then it would make sense for us to suffer now and get something better later, if the world really were designed that way as a matter of fact. And that’s what Christian theists believe is the case.

So, on Christian theism, self-sacrificial love is rational because it is in our own best interest to do so AND because it’s what we were designed to do. It’s the way the world is that makes it rational, and that objective reality can be investigated and sustained in a debate using the standard arguments. Self-sacrifice is rational on Christian theism because there is a state of affairs that makes it rational.

But there is more to it than just self-interest. You have to remember that Jesus’ self-sacrificial death on our behalf is a kind of call to action as well. It may be that many or even most Christians never think about rational self-interest. They think of relationships. They look around at the world and they are willing to take on the obligations of the moral law in the context of having a relationship with God. They don’t think of obeying the moral law as a way to get eternal happiness and eternal life, but as the only possible rational response to another person who sacrifices themselves to love them. It’s not just that we want eternal life, or eternal happiness. We want a relationship with that person who loves us. We have a desire to be loved in a non-temporary way. We want to know that other person as he really is. I would not call that desire self-interest.

I’m thinking of what I feel like when I ask a woman to spend time talking to me over a meal that I will pay for, and she says yes. She probably isn’t thinking that she is doing this in order to be made 100% happy with no demands on her own behavior. There is something more going on there than self-interest – she wants to have a relationship, and she is willing to make adjustments to have that relationship. Most Christians aren’t thinking that they are going to get eternal life or eternal happiness. They want to know who this God person is and they are not concerned about the fact that this person wants them to act a certain way as part of that relationship. We want the relationship. It’s rational for us to act in a way that keeps the relationship going.

Normally, to get a relationship started, I give a woman a book to read or a DVD to watch. That’s not fun for her. But it is a gift. Either she is going to want to know this person who chose her or she isn’t. Maybe she thinks I will make her happy, but that’s not why she takes that first step to follow me. She wants the relationship.

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Commentary

Brian Auten posts book review of “The Faith of the Fatherless”

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The book review is here on Apologetics 315.

Excerpt:

Vitz begins by laying out his hypothesis and the underlying principle behind it. He proposes that “atheism of the strong or intense type is to a substantial degree generated by the peculiar psychological needs of its advocates.”2  He notes that the theory that God is merely a projection of one’s needs is a popular position, but “the psychological concepts used so effectively to interpret religion by those who reject God are double-edged swords that can also, indeed easily, be used to explain their unbelief.”3  He makes clear one of the underlying assumptions of his study: “First, I assume that the major barriers to belief in God are not rational but can be called, in a general sense, psychological.”4

The psychological angle that Vitz examines is the role and influence of one’s father in the formation of beliefs about God. The author notes that “Christianity is in many respects distinctive in its emphasis on God as loving Father.”5 Vitz points out that “Freud makes the simple and easily understandable claim that once a child or youth is disappointed in or loses respect for his earthly father, belief in a heavenly father becomes impossible.”6 It is with this thesis in mind – the lack of a father plays a strong role in one’s psychological disposition towards rejecting God – that Vitz engages his case study comparing the lives of famous atheists and theists: “I have selected for study those who are historically famous as atheists. These are great thinkers, typically philosophers, whose rejection of God was central to their intellectual life and public positions.”7

Brian also cites Vitz explaining his own journey into atheism:

Just as I had learned how to dress like a college student by putting on the right clothes, I learned to think like a proper psychologist by putting on the right – that is, atheistic – ideas and attitudes. I wanted as few impediments to my professional career as it was possible.14

[…]In my own case, I now see that it was because of my social need to assimilate, my professional need to be accepted as part of the world of academic psychology, and my personal need for independence and an agreeable way of life that I chose to be an atheist. Hence, the intellectual basis for my atheism, like that of countless others, appears in retrospect to be much more of a shallow rationalization than an objective rationale.

I just ordered the book last week on Brian’s recommendation. You might also be interested in a lecture that Paul Vitz delivered on the psychological causes of atheism. (That link contains the MP3 file)

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Polemics

The evidence for the historical Jesus from non-Christian sources

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Here’s a chapter from a book about the historical evidence for Jesus from early non-Christian sources. The book (I’ve read it!) is from historian and debater Gary Habermas.

Here’s a discussion of the Roman historian Tacitus:

Tacitus. Cornelius Tacitus (ca. 55-120 A.D.) was a Roman historian who lived through the reigns of over a half dozen Roman emperors. He has been called the “greatest historian” of ancient Rome, an individual generally acknowledged among scholars for his moral “integrity and essential goodness.”

Tacitus is best known for two works — the Annals and the Histories. The former is thought to have included eighteen books and the latter to have included twelve, for a total of thirty. The Annals cover the period from Augustus’ death in 14 A.D. to that of Nero in 68 A.D., while the Histories begin after Nero’s death and proceed to that of Domitian in 96 A.D.

Tacitus recorded at least one reference to Christ and two to early Christianity, one in each of his major works. The most important one is that found in the Annals, written about 115 A.D. The following was recounted concerning the great fire in Rome during the reign of Nero:

Consequently, to get rid of the report, Nero fastened the guilt and inflicted the most exquisite tortures on a class hated for their abominations, called Christians by the populace. Christus, from whom the name had its origin, suffered the extreme penalty during the reign of Tiberius at the hands of one of our procurators, Pontius Pilatus, and a most mischievous superstition, thus checked for the moment, again broke out not only in Judaea, the first source of the evil, but even in Rome, where all things hideous and shameful from every part of the world find their centre and become popular. Accordingly, an arrest was first made of all who pleaded guilty; then, upon their information, an immense multitude was convicted, not so much of the crime of firing the city, as of hatred against mankind. Mockery of every sort was added to their deaths. Covered with the skins of beasts, they were torn by dogs and perished, or were nailed to crosses, or were doomed to the flames and burnt, to serve as a nightly illumination, when daylight had expired.

Nero offered his gardens for the spectacle, and was exhibiting a show in the circus, while he mingled with the people in the dress of a charioteer or stood aloft on a car. Hence, even for criminals who deserved extreme and exemplary punishment, there arose a feeling of compassion; for it was not, as it seemed, for the public good, but to glut one man’s cruelty, that they were being destroyed.

There’s some real value in this chapter because it surveys reports from other emminent Roman and Jewish historians writing in the first and second centuries. Habermas covers the Roman historian Suetonius, the Jewish historian Josephus, the Roman governor Pliny the Younger, and the Greek satirist Lucian. Something to read about if you’ve never looked into it. You won’t be able to find the whole New Testament in these non-Christian writings, but you can get some broad confirmation of early Christian beliefs.