I have been reading lots of books about the World War II battles in the Pacific theater lately, and I wanted to write a post about one of the heroes I found who was the most compelling to me. You may have seen him in the old 1976 Midway movie or the new 2019 Midway movie. But neither movie tells the full story. The man I am talking about is Lt. Commander John C. Waldron.
So, everyone knows the conclusion of the Battle of Midway. On June 4, 1942, Japan attacked the American-occupied island with carrier-based strike aircraft from 4 aircraft carriers, as a prologue to a planned amphibious landing. The Americans had broken the Japanese transmission code and were on site with 3 carriers (plus an airstrip on Midway) the morning of the attack. At the end of the first day, the Japanese had lost all 4 carriers, and the Americans had lost none, although Yorktown was heavily damaged. This (along with the defense of Guadalcanal) was a major turning point in the Pacific war. The Japanese would never again be on offense.
I like to blog about the story of John C. Waldron every year, and normally I use this old article from the Federalist that tells the story of John Waldron. But this year, I decided to use a different article from Warfare History Network, to maybe get a different angle on it.
So, their article starts with the key answer to the question – how were the Americans able to sink 4 carriers? And the answer is that when the squadrons of Dauntless dive bombers found the Japanese carriers, they were amazed to find that the the Japanese fighter cover was nowhere to be found. Why? Because 3 squadrons of these old and slow Devastator torpedo bombers had already attacked the Japanese carriers, without fighter escort. And they had pulled the superior Japanese Zero fighters out of position to low altitude, and exhausted their highly-effective 20 mm cannon ammunition.
The article says:
The pilots of Bombing Squadron 6 could not believe what they were seeing on the morning of June 4, 1942. The squadron was about 150 miles northwest of Midway atoll when good visibility allowed the dive-bombers from the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise to make out three Japanese carriers almost 20,000 feet below. The light tan flight decks clearly stood out against the backdrop of the deep blue sea. A fourth carrier stood off in the distance. Most remarkable was the absence of any Japanese Mitsubishi Zero fighter planes. At a time when the squadron expected to be swarmed by Zeros, none were present. Descending to an altitude of 15,000 feet, the airwaves lit up with the voice of Lt. Cmdr. Clarence McClusky. The air group commander gave final orders to his squadron leaders. “Earl Gallaher, you take the carrier on the left and Best, you take the one on the right. Earl, you follow me down.” McClusky immediately banked his Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bomber sharply to the right. He began a 70-degree dive toward the Japanese ships below and into history. The dive-bombers were not the first American carrier-based planes to attack the enemy flattops. Three squadrons of torpedo planes had already made low-level attacks. The first torpedo squadron to find the carriers had been Torpedo Squadron 8.
The article is a magnificent explanation of the battle, but the key point for us to focus on is the sacrifice of the three torpedo squadrons, and especially VT-8 (Hornet’s torpedo bomber squadron) which attacked first and had every single aircraft shot down with only one torpedo dropped that missed.
John Waldron was the leader of VT-8, which is the torpedo bomber squadron on the USS Hornet aircraft carrier. This squadron was composed of outdated and slow Devastator torpedo bombers, armed with the Mark 13 Mod 1 torpedoes, which malfunctioned at a very high rate.
I had Grok write up something for you about the plane and the weapon and here is the summary:
The Douglas TBD-1 Devastator featured a top speed of about 206 mph (much less when laden). It carried a single Mark 13 aerial torpedo. By 1942, it was obsolete: slow, poorly armored, with weak defensive armament (usually one forward .30- or .50-cal and a rear .30-cal). Its low speed and limited maneuverability made it highly vulnerable.
The Mark 13 torpedo was even more problematic. Early versions suffered severe reliability issues. A 1943 analysis of 105 drops at over 150 knots revealed: 36% ran cold (failed to propel), 20% sank, 20% had poor deflection (veered off), 18% had unsatisfactory depth performance, and only about 31% gave a satisfactory run—many with multiple defects. Drops required very low speed (~100 knots or less) and low altitude (~80 feet) from ~1,000 yards out for any chance of success, making the launching aircraft easy targets.
What I like about Waldron is that he is a native American. So, he is coming into the Navy as a kind of outsider. His boss however is exactly what you would expect: a tall, handsome, white naval aviator with a reputation for show-boating and attention-seeking for cameras. On the morning of June 4th, fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers all launched from the deck of the Hornet against the Japanese carriers, which had already been detected by US patrol aircraft:
In the Hornet’s ready room, the men of Torpedo 8 were up early to prepare for battle. Settling down into their comfortable chairs for briefings, the pilots found a memo from Lt. Cmdr. Waldron. His message concluded: “My greatest hope is that we encounter a favorable tactical situation, but if we don’t, and the worst comes to the worst, I want each of us to do his utmost to destroy our enemies. If there is only one plane left to make a final run-in, I want that man to go in and get a hit. May God be with us all. Good luck, happy landings and give ’em hell.”
The commander of Hornet’s entire air group was a tall, handsome white pilot named Stanhope Ring. He is more known for attention-seeking than for skill as a pilot, due to his long career of administrative jobs. He decided to launch the entire airgroup to the WEST even though the Japanese carriers had been spotted SOUTHWEST of the Hornet. Waldron voiced his disagreement, but Ring would not listen to him. Eventually, Waldron just ordered his torpedo squadron to break from the main strike package, and all his pilots listened to him, and disregarded Ring:
As the air group left the carrier, the torpedo planes stayed low while the faster bombers and fighters gained altitude. Early in the flight Waldron broke radio silence to continue his argument with Ring about the course to the Japanese carriers. A short time later Waldron turned his torpedo planes away from the rest of the air group. Before long the torpedo squadron was alone, separated from the rest of the air group in which it was to make a coordinated attack.
Just to be clear, disobeying Ring was a court martial offense, but Waldron was so intent on striking the enemy, that he had to do it. He could not be part of a strike mission that was not going to find the enemy planes, because of the leader’s incompetence.
Ring’s dive bombers and fighters went on a long flight without ever finding any targets. It is now called “Stanhope Ring’s Flight to Nowhere”. He landed back on the Hornet with all his munitions. But Waldron found the enemy carriers:
With good visibility, the pilots were able to identify three enemy carriers surrounded by a strong escort of cruisers and destroyers. Waldron had taken his squadron directly to the Japanese carriers.
Waldron sent a contact report to Ring, but Ring’s fighters and dive bombers did not acknowledge or change course to join up with Waldron’s torpedo bombers. It’s almost as if Ring couldn’t admit that he had made a mistake, and would rather see the torpedo bombers fail than admit he was wrong. So, would Waldron attack alone, without escort? It would be certain death to do it. But this might be their only chance to make a difference. Even if it meant a court martial later – assuming he survived, which was highly doubtful.
Here’s what he decided:
Waldron now had to make a critical decision—strike immediately unescorted, or wait for other squadrons to arrive to make a coordinated attack. He decided to attack and wiggled his wings to signal his decision to the rest of the group. The squadron immediately joined up in attack formation and dropped to 60 feet. Moving the planes close together allowed for concentrated fire from the rear guns.
[…]Approaching the carriers from the east, Waldron headed for the southernmost flattop. Noticing strong antiaircraft fire some distance ahead, he switched to the centrally located carrier. The target was about 16,000 yards away when Japanese fighters suddenly appeared. As many as 30 Zeros swarmed at the torpedo planes from above and behind. One Devastator on the left side of the formation immediately went down in flames.
[…]Waldron’s plane was hit shortly afterward and began to head toward the ocean with the left fuel tank ruptured and on fire.
The Devastators were shot down one by one until there were none left, and only one pilot survived and was later rescued. In the 1976 movie “Midway”, Vice Admiral Nagumo, the commander of the carrier strike force, says: “They sacrifice themselves like Samurai, these Americans.” That’s not how the military is presented in schools and culture today, but that’s how I see them, because I read the actual history!
Here’s the clip:
The movie emphasizes an additional effect of the sacrificial strike: the Japanese carriers cannot steer into the wind to launch their own strike against the American carriers. They are too busy dodging the torpedo bombers.
But it wasn’t just Waldron who sacrificed himself:
In the aftermath of Torpedo 8’s heroic attack, two additional torpedo squadrons located the Japanese carriers. Shortly after 9:30 am, Torpedo Squadron 6 from the Enterprise, under the command of Lt. Cmdr. Eugene Lindsey, attacked without fighter cover. At about 10 am. Torpedo Squadron 3 from the Yorktown attacked under the lead of Lt. Cmdr. Lance Massey. His escort group of six Wildcat fighter planes had been overwhelmed by Japanese Zeros.
Like Torpedo 8, these squadrons staged heroic attacks, suffered terrible losses, and scored no hits. Of the 41 torpedo planes that participated in the attacks, only six survived. Like Waldron, squadron commanders Lindsey and Massey were killed in action.
And, as we foreshadowed, the attacks were not in vain:
At about 10:20 am, Bombing Squadron 6 and Scouting Squadron 6 arrived from the Enterprise and dove toward the carriers Kaga and Soryu. Almost simultaneously, dive-bombers from the Yorktown attacked the carrier Akagi. Within five minutes all three Japanese carriers were burning as a result of direct bomb hits. The great battle once envisioned by the Japanese had now turned into a decisive American victory.
The importance of the torpedo attacks on the outcome of the battle cannot be underestimated. The brave assaults caused the Japanese fighter cover to be pulled out of position and antiaircraft gunners to focus on the low-level attackers. The evasive maneuvering needed to defend against the torpedo planes may have prevented the Japanese carriers from launching additional fighter planes. All levels of the Japanese air defense network were either out of position or unprepared to meet the subsequent dive bomber attacks.
This is my favorite part – they got their reward in the end:
In the aftermath of the battle, all 15 of the pilots who participated in the June 4 attack of Torpedo 8 were awarded the Navy Cross. The rear gunners received the Distinguished Flying Cross. On April 5, 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt awarded Torpedo Squadron 8 the Presidential Unit Citation. Praising the heroic attack, the citation concluded, “The loss of twenty-nine lives, typifying valor, loyalty, and determination, was the price paid for Torpedo Squadron 8’s vital contribution to the eventual success of our forces in this epic battle of the air.”
The names I remember from the Battle of Midway are the 3 leaders of the torpedo bomber squadrons: Waldron, Lindsey and Massey. I also remember McClusky for his decision to follow the racing Japanese destroyer despite being at “bingo” fuel levels. And I remember Brockman, the captain of the submarine Nautilus, whose attack caused that Japanese destroyer to have to stop to depth charge his submarine, and then race back to the carrier strike force at high speed, leading McClusky’s strike package to the main body.
You can learn more about the Battle of Midway in this helpful video:
This plaque at the United States Naval Academy Club honors the three commanders of the torpedo bomber squadrons:
According to the Family Research Council, the plaque reads:
The torpedo attacks of Waldron, Lindsey, and Massey had followed hard upon each other by luck. What was not luck, but the soul of the United States in action, was the willingness of the torpedo plane squadrons to go in against hopeless odds. This was the extra ounce of martial weight that in a few decisive minutes tipped the balance of history.
So, here is what I wanted to say about this.
John Waldron was not properly equipped by his organization to make a difference at Midway. His planes were too old and slow, his torpedoes almost never worked. His leader was incompetent and prevented him from leading others to find and attack the actual targets. The only way he could do something to his enemy was to disobey orders and go off on his own. If he had lived, he probably would have been court-martialed for insubordination. Everyone watching must have thought “what a waste of effort”. It was only later that it became evident to all that what he did was necessary for the second wave to succeed.
When I read this story, it immediately occurred to me that this is the problem that serious Christians are facing today. Instead of finding and fighting the real targets: atheism, radical feminism, communism, etc., all our forces have been sent on wild goose chases, so that now many Christian leaders are actually trying to promote the priorities of the secular left, e.g. – global warming, wealth redistribution, feminism, sexual immorality, open borders, critical race theory, etc.
My recommendation for Christians today is to focus their attention on studying the evidence in areas like science, economics and history, so that they can fulfill the mandate of 1 Peter 3:15 with authoritative teaching and appealing to “signs” (e.g. the origin of the universe, fine-tuning, the origin of life, etc.) in the same way that Jesus did. The main strike force is going in the wrong direction, and it falls to us to break off and strike the enemy alone.
WINTERY KNIGHT 